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Abstract. An asset network systemic risk (ANWSER) model is presented to 
investigate the impact of how shadow banks are intermingled in a financial 
system on the severity of financial contagion. Particularly, the focus of this 
study is the impact of the following three representative topologies of an 
interbank loan network between shadow banks and regulated banks. (1) 
Random mixing network: shadow banks and regulated banks are intermingled 
randomly. (2) Asset-correlated mixing network: banks having bigger assets are 
a regulated bank and other banks are shadow banks. (3) Layered mixing 
network: banks in a shadow bank layer are connected to banks in a regulated 
bank layer with some interbank loans. 
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1 Introduction 
Understanding how the characteristics of a financial system govern the 
financial contagion of bank bankruptcies is essential in the argument 
to reform the capital requirement and other regulatory standards. 
Recently computer simulation models [10], [12], [13], [16] are developed 
to mimic the transmission of financial distress and predict the systemic 
risk [3], [6], which is the severity of financial contagion in a financial 
crisis. Both the external assets and interbank loans of banks can be the 
origin of financial distress in these models. Either distress may 
transmit separately in a peace time while compound distress transmits 
in a crisis time. A bank makes an investment in multiple external asset 
classes. The value of the total external assets may depreciate when the 
markets fluctuate. A defective investment portfolio of banks imposes 
financial distress on them. A failing debtor bank becomes insolvent in 
paying off the interbank borrowings. Any creditor banks suffer 
financial distress from the failing debtor bank. A bank goes bankrupt 
unless the capital buffer absorbs the total loss from the external assets 
and interbank loans. Bank bankruptcies bring about still more 
  
financial distress repeatedly. This is the mechanism of financial 
contagion. 
A shadow banking system [2], [4], [5], [15] had grown rapidly to rival 
depository banks after 2000. A shadow bank is not a regulated bank, 
but such an unregulated financial intermediary as hedge funds, money 
market mutual funds, and investment banks. It is not subject to the 
international Basel III requirements on capital buffer, and monitoring 
by government authorities. Shadow banks have a very high level of 
leverage, which is a very high ratio of debts to liquid assets, through 
off-balance sheet financing. Consequently, they have merely a very poor 
capital buffer. The vulnerability of the shadow banking system was one 
of primary factors to cause the global financial crisis in 2008 that 
ensued from the collapse of the US subprime mortgage markets. The 
US government authorities placed significant blame for the freezing of 
credit markets on a run on shadow banks, which had borrowed 
short-term in liquid markets to purchase illiquid risky assets. 
In this study, we present a computer simulation model, which is called 
an asset network systemic risk (ANWSER) model [1], [8], [9], [11], to 
investigate the impact of how shadow banks are intermingled in a 
financial system on the severity of financial contagion. Particularly, we 
are interested in the impact of the following three representative 
topologies of an interbank loan network between shadow banks and 
regulated banks. 
(1) In the random mixing network, shadow banks and regulated banks 
are intermingled randomly. It is a reference network topology. (2) In the 
asset-correlated mixing network, banks having bigger assets are 
regulated banks and other banks are shadow banks. It is less trivial 
than the reference network topology. Big banks are subject to 
regulatory standards worldwide. It was announced in 2011 that the 
international Basel III requirements would impose a relatively high 
level of capital buffer, which means additional loss absorbency, on 
global systemically important banks. The fraction of shadow banks may 
have a big impact on financial contagion. (3) In the layered mixing 
network, a financial system consists of two bank layers, and banks in 
the shadow bank layer are connected to banks in a regulated bank 
layer with interbank loans. It is even less trivial than the reference 
network topology. The number of inter-layer loan relations may have a 
big impact on financial contagion. 
2 ANWSER model 
Models of interbank loans and investments are presented in this 
  
section. 
The asset network systemic risk model (ANWSER) is founded on 
previous computer simulation models. They investigate the statistical 
characteristics of a financial system with a Monte-Carlo method. The 
Monte-Carlo method is a broad class of a computational technique to 
obtain many samples of numerical outcomes which are used to analyze 
the statistical characteristics. The technique relies on a sequence of 
random numbers generated repeatedly from a specified probability 
distribution. The initial financial distress on banks is the falling prices 
of their external assets in the market. When a debtor bank happens to 
go bankrupt, the consequent interbank loan defaults are the next 
financial distress to its creditor banks. Financial distress transmits 
from failing debtor banks to creditor banks repeatedly in an interbank 
network. 
The number of banks is 𝑁. 𝑀 is the number of external asset classes 
in which an individual bank makes an investment. The interbank loan 
ratio of a financial system θ = Σ𝑙𝑛/Σ𝑎𝑛 is the total value of interbank 
loans as a fraction of the total value of assets. The assets of the 𝑛-th 
bank consist of the interbank loans 𝑙𝑛 and external assets 𝑒𝑛. The 
external assets are securities and government bonds. An interbank 
loan is the credit relation between a creditor bank and a debtor bank 
which appears when the debtor bank raises money in the interbank 
market. An interbank network describes the all credit relations. It is a 
directed graph which consists of banks as vertices, and the interbank 
loans as edges from creditor banks to debtor banks. The liability 
consists of the equity capital 𝑐𝑛, interbank borrowings 𝑏𝑛, and deposits 
𝑑𝑛. The equity capital includes common stock and disclosed reserves. 
The equity capital ratio (core tier 1 ratio) is γ𝑛 = Σ𝑐𝑛/Σ𝑎𝑛. These need 
not be paid off and can be used to absorb the loss from financial distress 
immediately. The amount of the assets is equal to that of the liability in 
the balance sheet, 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑙𝑛 + 𝑒𝑛 = 𝑐𝑛 + 𝑏𝑛 + 𝑑𝑛. 
The denseness κ of a financial system is the average incoming or 
outgoing nodal degree of the interbank network as a fraction of 𝑁 − 1. 
A more dense interbank network has a larger value of κ . The 
concentration ρ of a financial system is the sum of the interbank loan 
share of the five biggest banks. A more concentrated interbank network 
has a larger value of ρ. 
Given 𝑁  and 𝑀 , a sequence of random numbers is generated to 
synthesize a number samples for fixed values of θ, 𝛾𝑛, κ, and ρ. An 
individual sample includes: 
(1) Interbank network topology Z (an 𝑁  𝑁  matrix) where the element 
 𝑛𝑛 = 1  means the n'-th bank makes a loan from the n-th bank, and 
otherwise  𝑛𝑛 =  . 
  
(2) Investment portfolio X (an 𝑁  𝑀 matrix) where the element  𝑛  is the 
fraction of the investment which the n-th bank makes in the  -th external 
asset class (Σ 𝑛 = 1,    𝑛  1). 
(3) Prices of the external assets in the market   (an 𝑀 column vector) where the 
element    is the price of the unit of the  -th external asset class. 
 
The initial financial distress on the 𝑛 -th bank is 𝑒𝑛Σ 𝑛   . It is 
assumed that failing debtor banks do not pay off any portions of the 
interbank loans to creditor banks. A bank goes bankrupt if the total loss 
from the financial distress is not absorbed by its capital buffer 𝑐𝑛. 𝐹 is 
the number of banks which end in bankruptcy until the financial 
contagion comes to a halt. The empirical distribution of the number of 
bank bankruptcies 𝑃(𝐹) is obtained from those samples. The value of 
𝐹 is picked up at the 999-th 1000-quantile point as the representative 
in case of a financial crisis. 
It is known empirically that the nodal degree of the network and the 
value of the transferred funds between banks obey a power law. In this 
study, Z is generated randomly by a generalized Barabasi-Albert model. 
This is a random graph with the mechanism of growth and preferential 
attachment which becomes scale-free as N goes to infinity. The 
distribution of the nodal degree k obeys the power law 𝑃(𝑘) ∝ 𝑘−𝛼 
where α ≥ 2. There is a significant probability of the presence of very 
big banks. This is the origin of heterogeneity. 
The value of a loan 𝑤𝑛𝑛′ from the n-the bank to the n'-th bank is 
determined from the incoming nodal degree 𝑘𝑛
in and outgoing nodal 
degree 𝑘𝑛′
out in the interbank network topology by the generalized law: 
𝑤𝑛𝑛′ ∝ (𝑘𝑛
in 𝑘𝑛 
out)
𝑟
. The concentration ρ increases as 𝑟 ≥   increases. 
The value of interbank loans is a constant if  𝑟 =  . Once the value of 
𝑤𝑛𝑛′ is given, the interbank loans and borrowings of individual banks 
are determined. Then the balance sheet of individual banks is 
determined from the values of θ  and 𝛾𝑛 . A prerequisite that the 
external assets are no less than the net interbank borrowings are 
imposed because the bank has already gone bankrupt if this 
prerequisite is not satisfied. 
A bank chooses multiple external asset classes to make an investment 
in randomly. When 𝑀 = 2,  𝑛1 and  𝑛2 obey a uniform distribution. 
The prices of the external asset classes are independently and 
identically distributed. The absolute fluctuation in their prices obeys a 
uni-variate Student t-distribution. The prices rise or fall randomly. The 
degree of freedom is μ = 1.5. This is a long tailed distribution which is 
suitable to describe a sudden large fluctuation. The amplitude of the 
absolute fluctuation is adjusted so that the probability of a bank with 
the equity capital ratio γ =  . 7 alone going bankrupt can be 𝑝 = 1 −3. 
  
3 Network topology 
The focus of this study is the impact of the following three 
representative topologies of an interbank loan network between 
shadow banks and regulated banks. Empirically, some of real financial 
system may be close to the asset-correlated mixing network. Some of 
government authorities seem to believe the layered mixing network is 
relatively robust. 
(1) Random mixing network: Shadow banks and regulated banks are 
intermingled randomly. It is a reference network topology. The number of 
shadow bank as a fraction of 𝑁 is     1. Fig. 1 shows an example 
topology when 𝑁 =     =0.5. Blue nodes are shadow banks. Their number 
is 𝑁 =  .5𝑁 . Red nodes are regulated banks. Their number is 𝑁 =
𝑁 − 𝑁 =  .5𝑁. 
(2) Asset-correlated mixing network: Banks having bigger assets are regulated 
banks and other banks are shadow banks. It is less trivial than the reference 
network topology. Big banks are subject to regulatory standards worldwide. 
It was announced in 2011 that the international Basel III requirements would 
impose a relatively high level of capital buffer, which means additional loss 
absorbency, on global systemically important banks. As a result, the equity 
capital ratio is correlated to the amount of assets generally in a real financial 
system. Such a core-periphery network as the asset-correlated mixing 
network is a simplified but still substantial replica of the real financial 
network. The number of shadow bank as a fraction of 𝑁 is     1. The 
fraction of shadow banks may have a big impact on financial contagion. Fig. 
2 shows an example topology. Shadow banks are peripheral small banks. 
Regulated banks are central big banks. 
(3) Layered mixing network: A financial system consists of two bank layers, 
and banks in the shadow bank layer are connected to banks in a regulated 
bank layer with interbank loans. It is even less trivial than the reference 
network topology. Some of government authorities believe separating a 
financial system into multiple bank layers is effective in mitigating the 
severity of financial contagion. The layered mixing network is reasonable in 
such a regulatory belief. The number of shadow bank as a fraction of 𝑁 is 
 =  .5.  The number of inter-layer loan relations may have a big impact on 
financial contagion. The denseness of the inter-layer links is   , while the 
denseness in the intra-layer links is  . The quantity      1 adjusts the 
inter-layer denseness relative to the intra-layer denseness. The two bank 
layers are decoupled completely when  =  . The denseness is uniform all 
over the network when  = 1. Fig. 3 shows an example topology. A 
non-trivial layer structure is visible clearly. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1 Example topology of a random mixing network when 𝑁 = 𝑁 =
 .5𝑁 𝑁 =   . Blue nodes are shadow banks. Red nodes are regulated 
banks. 
 
 
  
Fig. 2 Example topology of an asset-correlated mixing network when 
𝑁 = 𝑁 =  .5𝑁 𝑁 =   . Blue nodes are shadow banks. Red nodes are 
regulated banks. 
 
Fig. 3 Example topology of a layered mixing network when 𝑁 = 𝑁 =
 .5𝑁 𝑁 =   . Blue nodes belong to the shadow bank layer. Red nodes 
belong to the regulated bank layer. 
4 Result 
The experimental conditions are as follows. The number of external 
asset classes is 𝑀 = 2 . The values of the parameters are θ =  . , 
𝛾 =  . 6 for shadow banks and 𝛾 =  .1 for regulated banks, κ =  . 5, 
and ρ =  .25. The number of nodes is 𝑁 = 5   for the random mixing 
network.  The number of nodes is 𝑁 = 5   for the asset-correlated 
mixing network. The number of shadow banks is determined by   in 
both topologies. The number of nodes is 𝑁 = 𝑁 = 5   for the layered 
mixing network. The fraction of shadow banks is fixed at  =  .5. The 
creditor and debtor banks of an inter-layer interbank loan are chosen 
randomly. 
(1) Random mixing network: The curve (a) in Fig. 4 shows the number of bank 
bankruptcies 𝐹( ) as a function of the fraction of shadow banks. The 
number of bankruptcies is larger than that shown by the straight line (c) 
𝐹( ) = 𝐹( ) +  𝑁 , which assumes every shadow bank goes bankrupt, 
when the fraction of shadow banks is 10% through 50%. This is a clear 
  
evidence of financial contagion from a shadow banking system to regulated 
banks. 
(2) Asset-correlated mixing network: The number of bank bankruptcies shown 
by the curve (a) in Fig. 5 is much larger than that shown by the curve (b), 
which is the number of bankruptcies for a hypothetical network where the all 
banks have the average equity capital ratio 𝛾 = 𝛾 = ?̅? = Σ𝑐𝑛/Σ𝑎𝑛 
uniformly. Given the total amount of capital buffer, banks having 
heterogeneous equity capital ratio is more vulnerable than banks having 
homogeneous equity capital ratio. 
(3) Layered mixing network: Fig. 6 shows the ratio of increase in the number of 
bank bankruptcies as a function of  . The ratio is defined by  ( ) =
[𝐹( ) − 𝐹( )]/𝐹( ). The relative denseness   is the inter-layer denseness 
relative to the intra-layer denseness. 𝐹 ( ) =  6  (94%) shadow banks and 
𝐹 ( ) = 12  (25%) regulated banks go bankrupt when  =   and  = 1. 
592 banks (59%) go bankrupt in total. The number of bankruptcies increases 
even for very small values of    . 5 because more regulated banks go 
bankrupt (see the curve (c)). There are few surviving shadow banks 
regardless of the value of   (see the curve (b)). This implies financial 
contagion from shadow banks to regulated banks. Decoupling a financial 
system into multiple layers does not necessarily mitigate the severity of 
financial contagion because   cannot be zero under a practical 
circumstance. On the other hand, the number of bankruptcies does not 
increase for large values of    .2. The financial distress from shadow 
banks is leveled off by many neighboring regulated banks. But the number 
of bankruptcies is still much larger than that when the layers are decoupled 
completely. Note that the reason why the curves fluctuate is not evident. 
This is for future study. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Number of bank bankruptcies as a function of the fraction of 
  
shadow banks. (a) Random mixing network, (b) hypothetical network 
where the all banks have the average equity capital ratio (?̅? = Σ𝑐𝑛/Σ𝑎𝑛) 
uniformly, and (c) 𝐹( ) = 𝐹( ) +  𝑁. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Number of bank bankruptcies as a function of the fraction of 
shadow banks. (a) Asset-correlated mixing network, (b) hypothetical 
network where every bank has the average equity capital ratio 
(?̅? = Σ𝑐𝑛/Σ𝑎𝑛) uniformly, and (c) 𝐹( ) = 𝐹( ) +  𝑁. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Ratio of the increase in the number of bank bankruptcies 
 ( ) = [𝐹( ) − 𝐹( )]/𝐹( ) as a function of  . The relative denseness   
  
is the inter-layer denseness relative to the intra-layer denseness in the 
layered mixing network. (a) Entire financial system, (b) banks in the 
shadow bank layer, and (c) banks in the regulated bank layer. 
5 Conclusion 
The findings in this study include: 
(1) Random mixing network: Financial contagion from shadow banks causes the 
bankruptcies of regulated banks when the fraction of shadow banks is 10% 
through 50%. 
(2) Asset-correlated mixing network: The number of bankruptcies is much larger 
than that for a hypothetical network where every bank has the average equity 
capital ratio uniformly. This finding also holds true to the random mixing 
network. 
(3) Layered mixing network: The number of bankruptcies increases even for a 
very small value of the inter-layer denseness relative to the intra-layer 
denseness. 
The findings imply that failing shadow banks may affect regulated 
banks and consequently the entire financial system, banks having 
heterogeneous equity capital ratio may be vulnerable, and layer 
decoupling may not eliminate financial contagion. These implications 
are relevant to the argument to reform the capital requirement and 
regulatory standards. 
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